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Internalization theory explains how the multinational enterprise (MNE) makes deci-
sions on new investments but does not explicitly address the restructuring
(i.e., unbundling) processes that can take place within the MNE network of subsidi-
aries. Further extensions to internalization theory have considered the ways MNEs
recombine, bundle, unbundle and orchestrate resources but have yet to address spe-
cifically the issue of divestments and relocations. We contribute to the literature by
extending internalization theory through conceptualizing footloose behavior, a
repeated relocation of divested operations over a period of time, and approaching
MNEs behavior in a holistic way. Empirically, we use four case studies of mature,
complex and diversified MNEs within the context of European Union (EU). These
MNEs have engaged in several investments, divestments and relocations over several
years. Through the analysis of their behavior we demonstrate how the inclusion of
divestments and relocations can extend internalization theory in explaining the
modern MNE.
K E YWORD S
construct development and evaluation, European Union, evaluation of current theories,
integration of pre-existing theoretical approaches, internalization theory, international
business theory
1 | INTRODUCTION
Internalization theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE) has
remained one of the most influential theories explaining the existence,
evolution and strategic management of the MNEs (Buckley, 2016;
Casson, 2015). Over the last 40 years, since its original introduction,
the theory has evolved to remain current with changes in the external
environment as well as the evolution of the modern MNE. Fundamen-
tally, internalization theory builds on the work of Coase (1937) explor-
ing market imperfections and suggesting that some transactions are
more efficiently performed internally rather than externally. Initially,
internalization theory aimed to explain why Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) was focused on knowledge-intensive industries (Casson, 2014)
and offered explanations on the choice of the entry mode between
market and non-market modes of operation.
Internalization theory suggests that the benefits of internalizing the
market should outweigh the costs (Buckley, 2014; Buckley &
Casson, 1976; Casson, 2014), i.e., “the advantages of internalizing a mar-
ket are the obverse of outsourcing” (Buckley, 2014, p. 229). Casson (2014)
argues that international business (IB) literature extensively covers the
benefits of internalizing the market, but almost ignores the costs, which
increase significantly with the size and international expansion of the firm.
According to Buckley and Casson (2019) MNEs can demonstrate high
levels of versatility. This versatility is reflected in changes in the structure
of the MNE through new investments and divestments as the MNE
requires a consolidation of resources before expanding further.
Through the work of Rugman and Verbeke (2003) and
Hennart (2009) internalization theory has been developed to add a
dynamic dimension. In search of the optimal boundary, multinational
enterprises do not remain static. Firms change and evolve, with time,
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due to different firm-specific advantages (FSAs) (e.g., new technologi-
cal developments) and country-specific advantages (CSAs)
(e.g., European integration). The interaction of FSA/CSA governs the
“boundary” (i.e., the scale) of the firm. Hence, when these factors
change, the cost/benefits balance may also shift, and consequently,
the boundary of the firm may be pushed back (i.e., the firm will reduce
its size). Activities that no longer contribute to the firms' strategic
goals become valueless “empty calories” (IBM, 2014, p. 3) and should
be divested if the firm wants to avoid potential failure. Buckley (2016)
argues that a key avenue of extending internalization theory is
through the dynamic nature of the theory. It is through adding and
explaining divestments and relocations where the present study aims
at extending internalization theory further. Divestments and reloca-
tions enable firms to rationalize their size once they have exceeded
their optimum size (Casson, 2014) and to reallocate resources to more
promising, or new, product lines and markets.
To extend internalization theory, we build on the work of Rugman
and Verbeke (1992, 2003), Rugman (2010), Narula and Ver-
beke (2015), Hennart (2009) and Pitelis and Teece (2018). This study
complements prior studies by Buckley and Casson (2019), Strange
and Humphrey (2019) and Gaur, Pattnaik, Singh, and Lee (2019) publi-
shed in a Journal of International Business Studies special issue on
extending internalization theory. We use resource recombination,
bundling and unbundling and orchestration as ways to extend inter-
nalization theory and conceptualize footloose behavior, as a repeated
relocation of divested operations over a period of time. Through an
orchestration approach (Pitelis & Teece, 2018) the MNE decides to
drop out old and obsolete assets and bring in new assets to facilitate
its functioning. Asset orchestration can span across firm boundaries
through a variety of collaborative modes.
First, we approach internalization theory from a strategic perspec-
tive and build on arguments developed by Rugman and Verbeke (1992,
2003) to argue that footloose behavior, a repeated relocation of
divested operations over a period of time can be seen as a process of
constant bundling (i.e., investment), unbundling (i.e., divestment) and
re-bundling (i.e., relocation) of resources to balance the optimal size
and growth of the MNE. We argue that this process depends both on
the nature of CSAs and their changes but primarily on the type of
FSAs used, that is, location-bound versus non-location bound FSAs.
According to Narula and Verbeke (2015), FSAs sustainability comes
through a constant search for locational characteristics that can lead
to the creation of non-location bounded FSAs. For complex MNEs
linkages between a variety of transactions can lead to differential out-
comes in the investment/divestment behavior of the MNE (Narula &
Verbeke, 2015).
We extend this argument by including Hennart's (2009) approach
and looking at the cost and availability of accessing CSAs. We take
this approach a step further and argue that MNEs might not only opt
for lower control modes of operations, as argued by Hennart (2009)
but completely divest should their FSAs be not strong enough.
In addition to the earlier extension, we integrate the investment
motives proposed by Dunning (1993), Dunning and Lundan (2008)
with the work of Rugman (2010) to explain how certain types of
investment motives, such as resource, market and efficiency-seeking
lead to higher levels of footloose activity when compared with strate-
gic asset-seeking.
Despite the conceptual nature of the article, we offer an empirical
discussion with some practical examples through a case study
approach. Building on information from FDI Markets and Eurofound
we have identified four MNEs. We use these MNEs as a basis for our
discussion and practical examples. All four MNEs have had a number
of divestments and investments as a response to changing CSAs and
FSAs configurations. Our discussion demonstrates empirically how
our extension of internalization theory can explain the modern MNE
and its behavior holistically, accounting not only for new investments
but also divestments and relocations.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Next
section provides our conceptual framework in extending internaliza-
tion theory and developing two propositions. The following
section offers a discussion and practical examples on the application
of our proposed extension. Finally, the last section of the article con-
cludes and discusses limitations as well as future research.
2 | CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 | Definition of footloose behavior
We define footloose behavior as a repeated relocation of divested
operations over a period of time. “Repeated” refers to the systematic
character of divestments and relocations. A one-time relocation can
refer to a random event. “Divestment” refers to a cessation of all or
of a major part of existing active operations that reduces the presence
in the foreign market (Belderbos & Zou, 2006; Boddewyn, 1979). We
subdivide divestments into three groups: (1) exit from the market;
(2) closure of a subsidiary; and (3) organizational restructuring. Divest-
ment is termed as “relocation” when terminated activities in the sub-
sidiary are relocated to another country: (1) by establishing a new
subsidiary, and (2) by increasing a market scope, product scope or
value-added scope of an existing subsidiary (White & Poynter, 1984).
The main theoretical anchors that allow us to position the concept of
footloose behavior—is the literature that explains different aspects of
MNE's activity, that is, investments (Buckley & Casson, 1976), divest-
ments (Benito, 2005; Benito, 2006; Boddewyn, 1979;
Boddewyn, 1983; Burt, Dawson, & Sparks, 2003), relocations
(Belderbos & Zou, 2006; Buckley & Mucchielli, 1997; Filippov &
Kalotay, 2011).
Despite efforts to discuss divestment from a strategic perspec-
tive, studies by Boddewyn (1983) and Berry (2010) are isolated
efforts. Boddewyn (1983) offers a discussion of the factors that drive
divestments, summarizing them in return on assets, strategic and
behavioral and resource allocation. Following the same line of argu-
ment, Berry (2010) argues that growth and expansion involve divest-
ment and investment. Thus far, only a limited number of studies have
addressed the issue of footloose behavior (Cowling & Sugden, 1999;
Flamm, 1984; Görg & Strobl, 2003; Van Beveren, 2007). The focus of
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these studies is not on the MNEs' strategic behavior but on the nega-
tive impact footloose behavior has on the host country's economy.
This strand of the literature emphasizes that footloose behavior
emerges only due to the adverse shocks in the host country's environ-
ment that bring changes to the CSAs; thus, these studies largely
ignore the characteristics of the firm, in the form of FSAs, which may
also drive footloose behavior.
2.2 | The combination of CSAs and FSAs and
footloose behavior
According to Rugman and Verbeke (1992) internalization of activities
reflects the market failure. This market failure exists, in the vast
majority of cases, due to natural or government-created market
imperfections. The MNE owns internationally transferable FSAs (non-
location bound) and non-transferable FSAs (location bound). The first
ones represent technological, marketing or administrative (gover-
nance-related) knowledge that allows the MNE to reduce the costs of
doing business abroad. This knowledge can either be codifiable which
can be transferred cheaply, but it is also easy to be copied and repli-
cated or tacit with more challenges when transferring to the host
location but more difficult to imitate from competitors. The value of
these non-location bound FSAs could differ substantially from country
to country depending on the goals of the MNE. The second set of
FSAs represent access to a network of standalone resources (e.g., a
network of distributors), local marketing knowledge or reputational
resources, local best practices (e.g., routines) and some domestic
recombination capability of resources. These FSAs can only be cre-
ated by linking with existing third parties operating in host markets.
As the MNE enters new locations, it is important to develop new
location-bound FSAs in the host country. These will act in a comple-
mentary way to the non-location bound FSAs and will enable the firm
to maximize the utility from locational characteristics. When seen in
the context of internalization theory, Rugman and Verbeke (1992)
argue that the core FSAs are non-location bound and originate from
the parent company, whilst CSAs are exogenous, cannot be influenced
directly by the MNE and therefore can be used in a local and static
sense. It, therefore, depends on the MNE whether resources could
complement CSAs in a way that can generate long-term FSAs. It is
also worth pointing out that internalization advantages will depend on
a MNE's transactional FSAs to operate foreign subsidiaries. The MNE
will create value through the recombination of resources. This recom-
bination is, at the same time, a key driver but also a constraint and can
take a variety of forms. Rugman's view (Narula & Verbeke, 2015) of
resource recombination can lead not only to new investments but also
to the change of role in existing subsidiaries as well as divestments.
According to Verbeke and Kano (2016), there are four combina-
tion processes: fast bundling, principles driven bundling, adaptive bun-
dling, and entrepreneurial resource orchestration. These processes are
from lower to higher-order, and as they approach the entrepreneurial
resource orchestration they require entrepreneurial skills, slack
resources and willingness and capacity to let go of existing resources
in order to substitute them with higher value-creating potential. This
leads to the creation of the highest order FSA for an MNE which is
the recombination capability. The Rugman and Verbeke (1992)
approach to internalization theory assumes that the MNE can access
CSAs at no cost and can recombine those seamlessly across national
boundaries. Responding to this approach, Hennart (2009) has devel-
oped a framework showing that this assumption of cost-free bundling
between FSAs and CSAs is not always correct. There might be cases
where local CSAs are controlled by actors and therefore accessing
them does not come without a cost. Hennart's (2009) approach sup-
ports the evolution of an MNE's engagement in a location and shows
that the MNE can move between equity and non-equity modes. We
take this argument a step further and argue that when this cost of
accessing CSAs is high or reduced in alternative locations, the MNE
might decide to change the subsidiary's mandate or even divest.
To optimize the internalization in a growing firm, MNEs may start
to relocate existing operations, which involve the movement of non-
location bound FSAs from one country to another, leading to an
increase of the efficiency of the network (i.e., when benefits of internal-
izing activities outweigh the costs). Internalization theory assumes a lin-
ear process of increasing engagement in the host market as the MNE
gains experience and therefore, faces reduced transaction costs. Build-
ing on our previous argument, this is not always linked with a switch to
higher control modes. We argue that it is the strength of the FSAs that
will determine whether the MNE will decide to remain in the host mar-
ket even through a lower control mode or the decision will be made to
relocate/divest its assets. We also argue that higher levels of non-
location bound FSAs will lead to footloose behavior. The relocation and
recombination capability of resources is associated with the necessity
to rationalize the portfolio of existing operations in such a way that it
will increase the efficiency gains of the differentiated MNE network.
Based on the earlier, we put forward our first proposition:
Proposition 1. The insufficient bundling of non-location bound FSAs
with CSAs, reduces the ability of the MNE to generate strong
location-bound FSAs and increases the footloose behavior.
2.3 | CSA/FSA, investment motives, and footloose
behavior
According to Rugman (2010), the CSA/FSA framework can be used to
complement Dunning's (1993), Dunning and Lundan's (2008) motiva-
tions of multinationals. FDI takes place in those cases where FSAs are
combined with high CSAs. According to Rugman (2010), three types of
motives, that is, resource-seeking, market seeking, and efficiency-
seeking emerge in cases where the MNE combines a high level of CSAs
with a low level of FSAs. These motives are reflected in the operations
of the subsidiary in the host location. According to Gaur et al. (2019)
internalization theory should focus on the MNE's subsidiary to provide
reasonable explanations to the modern MNE's evolution.
In resource-seeking motivation, the MNE invests because the loca-
tion can offer a number of CSAs such as an abundance of natural
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resources and suitable infrastructure to transport these resources
(Castiglione, Gorbunova, Infante, & Smirnova, 2012; Wilson &
Baack, 2012). In the case of the natural resource-seeking motivation,
footloose behavior is unlikely to occur unless a firm can source these
resources somewhere else (Benito, 2015). In resource-seeking behavior
associated with access to low-cost resources, footloose behavior might
emerge if these resources (usually the cost of the labor force) become
relatively expensive in comparison to other locations. Economic devel-
opment, for example, can lead to an increase in input costs. In market-
seeking investments, key CSAs are the size of the market, its geographi-
cal proximity to other markets, the level of economic development and
the availability of skilled, but reasonably priced labor force
(Benito, 2015; Castiglione et al., 2012; Ramasamy & Yeung, 2010;
Wilson & Baack, 2012). Market size and opportunities for future growth
are crucial (Ramasamy & Yeung, 2010), but “if there is a trade-off
between market size over the market growth, manufacturing inves-
tors would prefer market size” (Ramasamy & Yeung, 2010, p. 590). In
efficiency-seeking investments, CSAs mostly reflect the potential incen-
tives a location can offer to the firm. For example, government involve-
ment in removing trade restrictions (Wilson & Baack, 2012), facilitation
of infrastructure development (Benito, 2015; Wilson & Baack, 2012),
development in the area of human resources (Wilson & Baack, 2012),
more favorable business environment such as government incentives,
country's economic and political stability are key CSAs. It is worth
highlighting though that government actions such as removing trade
barriers or advancing regional integration do not attract the FDI on their
own because open borders do not imply that locations can offer other
complementary factors such as strong local capabilities (Loll and
Narula, 2004). A key CSA is also the reasonable price of labor
(Ramasamy & Yeung, 2010) paired with reasonable purchasing power
(Castiglione et al., 2012). Divestment can also be complemented by out-
sourcing when an MNE switches from internal production to produc-
tion through an external partner. This switch is common in
manufacturing, an activity that is predominantly driven by the
efficiency-seeking motive (Strange & Humphrey, 2019).
The earlier CSAs are complemented with location bound FSAs.
Gaur et al. (2019) argue that the host location environment plays a
significant role in the way MNEs leverage their FSAs. In their study,
they find that MNEs tend to leverage their FSAs better in countries
with weaker institutional environments (Gaur et al., 2019). In
resource-seeking FDI and specifically natural resource-seeking, invest-
ments tend to flow into developing countries where the rule of law
tends to be weak; thus, internalization helps the MNE to secure the
stability of production output in highly volatile environments. In the
case of market-seeking, FSAs such as property rights, that is, brand
name, trademark or an innovative product (Benito, 2015) are crucial.
Within market-seeking motivation, we need to highlight the impor-
tance of local adaptation. Local adaptation could require additional
financial inflows or specific technology and knowledge. In the case of
efficiency-seeking investments, the key FSA is the firm's ability to
reorganize the network. Investments are performed to build better
(more efficient) production facilities and consequently locate the pro-
duction facilities in a way that increases the overall efficiency
(specialization or clustering) of the MNE (e.g., more efficient logistics)
(Benito, 2015). A core FSA used in efficiency-seeking driven invest-
ments is the firm's ability to maximize the benefits of activities under
common governance. Common governance can have two aims: to
coordinate different activities in different parts of the world and to
coordinate the same activity in diverse environments.
Strategic asset-seeking, on the other hand, results from a more
advanced combination of CSAs with FSAs. In this case, high-level CSAs
are combined with a high level of FSAs, in the vast majority of non-
location bound FSAs. Strategic asset-seeking is a forward-looking
investment motivation, and “it is about developing new resources and
capabilities that can generate future streams of revenue, not exploiting
already existing ones” (Benito, 2015, p. 6). From a CSA perspective, the
location should offer a number of factors to be attractive. High levels of
intellectual property protection, reduced volatility of economic condi-
tions and well-developed infrastructure and a highly skilled labor force
are amongst them. These CSAs are linked with high-level FSAs such as
R&D, customer service and innovation (Wilson & Baack, 2012). Consid-
ering that footloose behavior is a systematic activity (repeated reloca-
tions) we argue that in the case of strategic asset-seeking investments,
the nature of such investments (i.e., long-term investment) makes them
less prone to footloose behavior. As Benito (2015, p. 8) argues: “Com-
panies that venture abroad for strategic asset-seeking motivations are
likely to prioritise control over their foreign operations, perhaps overrid-
ing other relevant concerns”. On the basis of the earlier arguments, we
put forward our second proposition:
Proposition 2. Resource-seeking, Market-seeking and Efficiency-seeking
investments will be more sensitive to changes in the CSAs and
FSAs combinations than Strategic asset-seeking investments and
will lead to more frequent footloose behavior by the MNE.
3 | DISCUSSION AND PRACTICAL
EXAMPLES
In order to provide some empirical support to our conceptual argu-
ments we decided to explore footloose behavior within the European
Union (EU) context. Two reasons can be used to support our decision
to focus on the EU, one conceptual and one empirical. Conceptually,
the EU has, over the last 30 years, gone through a transformational
process of integration, accession of new member states and introduc-
tion of common policies and regulations. It offers a stable economic
and political environment which also reflects a degree of change that
we cannot find in any other regional integration group of developed
countries (Barrell & Pain, 1999; Filippaios & Papanastassiou, 2008).
Table 1 offers a summary of the key arguments supporting the selec-
tion of EU as a research context.
Empirically, the EU offers a well-developed database, sponsored by
the European Commission capturing the vast majority of divestments
and relocations of both domestic and multinational companies. The
Eurofound European Restructuring Monitor by The European Founda-
tion for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
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(Eurofound, 2017) monitors media announcements regarding large
restructuring activities of companies operating in the 28 EU member
states. As media announcements are included in the database, most of
them contain an explanation on divestments and relocations. We have
complemented this database with FDI Markets (FDI Intelligence, 2017), a
division of the Financial Times Ltd. FDI Markets is a comprehensive and
highly detailed online database, which covers all cross-border greenfield
investments in all countries and sectors. The database holds information
about the parent company (HQ), the investing company (subsidiary),
source/destination country and city, industry and sector, number of jobs
created and the amount of invested capital.
By combining these two databases, we have a detailed picture of
MNEs behavior in new investments, divestments and relocations. For
the purpose of this article, we have focused on examples from the most
active companies in both investments and divestments/relocations over
the period 2002–2015. Through the classification of companies com-
bining information from the two databases, we have concluded in four
companies representing different industries to offer a wider interpreta-
tion of findings and a variety of examples. The four companies are IBM
with 3 divestments and 166 investments, Johnsons Controls with 3 and
33 divestments and investments, respectively, Electrolux with 3 and
34 and finally Procter and Gamble with 5 and 33 divestments and
investments respectively. In all cases, except for IBM, the disinvestment
activity represents close to 10% of the overall activity of the MNE,
demonstrating the importance of the phenomenon. These companies
also provide examples from a variety of industries.
3.1 | IBM and the case of Ireland
International Business Machines (IBM) was founded in 1911
(Marketline, 2017) and has gone through a lot of transformations in
its 106 years of existence. The company has managed to survive in a
changing environment and remains a leader in the Software and IT
industry. IBM is a large, mature and diversified MNE. We argue that
IBM has dealt a few times with the optimum network size reflecting
the boundaries of the firm set by internalization. According to
Casson (2014) when a firm reaches its size limit (which is its margin), it
either breaks down and fails, or the firm will make rationalization deci-
sions that involve a careful exit strategy from locations that no longer
serve the company's goals. We extend this argument by suggesting
that rationalization of activities is not a one-time event; it is a system-
atic activity (i.e., footloose behavior). We argue that IBM constantly
adopts a footloose behavior (i.e., divestment of “empty calories” in
the company's own language), as it is the only way to sustain effi-
ciency and remain competitive.
An example that supports the earlier argument is IBM's divestment
from Ireland (2009) and subsequent relocation to Singapore with a
market-seeking purpose. IBM has a long history to its presence in Ireland;
however, the market in Ireland, and its relatively small size, does not
allow IBM to take advantage of expansion opportunities. Therefore, the
company decided to relocate to Singapore. This divestment comes
shortly after an investment in Ireland, in 2007, because it was an “ideal”
location with a welcoming environment reflecting rapid economic growth
and high technological activity. The 2007 investment captures an
efficiency-seeking investment motive (i.e., the location has some attrac-
tive features and fits MNE efficiency goals) but in the years that followed
other locations emerged (e.g., Singapore) that offered a better strategic
fit to the MNE's goals. Hence, in 2007 Ireland was indeed a good loca-
tion with impressive benefits, but this changed for IBM in 2009, and IBM
decided to divest. The short time frame (2 years only) is crucial in this
example. It indicates that CSAs can change rapidly, and unless there is a
strong bundle with FSAs, footloose behavior emerges. When IBM
announced its relocation to Singapore and to a certain extent to China,
they also announced that Ireland would become a center for research
and development. In other words, IBM made several consecutive invest-
ments/relocations over the course of 2 years (2009 and 2010) but
decided to reinvest in Ireland again in 2010 in a different activity. In
2010 IBM invested in the establishment of a research center, showing a
strong strategic asset-seeking motive with a combination of CSAs and
non-location bound FSAs.
3.2 | Johnson controls in Portugal and Spain
Johnson Controls (JC) was established in 1885, and has, since,
remained a leading company in the automotive components
industry operating in more than 150 countries (Johnson
Controls, 2017). In 2006, JC divested two manufacturing plants in
Portugal due to the need to “adjust the output capacity in Europe”
(Eurofound, 2017). This may suggest that JC overproduced in
Europe and they had to restore efficiency in their operations. They
decided to relocate Portuguese activities to Germany and Slovenia.
In 2009, there was another case of divestment, and subsequent
relocation from Spain, which was similar to the Portuguese case.
JC announced that the financial crisis was the reason they had to
leave Spain. This reason is in line with our argument about the
role of CSAs and the ability of the organization to use them in
building strong FSAs. In 2013, JC also announced the closure of
another factory in Spain due to restructuring measures. It is clear
TABLE 1 Key reasons supporting the selection of EU as research
setting
Conceptual Empirical




countries (Greece, Spain, and
Portugal) and towards the
East with the integration of
central and eastern European
countries in 2004
• Stable economic and political
environment with lower






sponsored by the European
Commission
• Significant investment activity
from MNEs over the period of
investigation
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that JC divested from the second Spanish factory because it had
stopped being efficient and has fallen below the minimum effi-
ciency threshold acceptable by JC. While JC announced the clo-
sure of a production plant in Spain, they also announced an
additional investment in Spain. In the same year, JC announced
an expansion investment in Spain, in another plant, as their client,
Renault, was also located there. This line of behavior illustrates a
straightforward case of footloose behavior. Spain, as a
manufacturing location was no longer good enough to have a
general manufacturing capacity, but the presence of Renault, a JC
client, changed their perspective to some extent.
3.3 | Procter & Gamble and a Pan-European
restructuring
Procter & Gamble (P&G) is a multinational company and a manufac-
turer of consumer packaged products of 50 (Reingold, 2016)
TABLE 2 Summary of case studies
Case study Divestments Footloose behavior illustrations
Why did the firm engage in footloose
behavior?
IBM Ireland • 2007—Investment to Ireland
• 2009 and 2010—divestment from Ireland
(high-end servers)
• 2009—investment (relocation) to Singapore
(high-end servers)
• 2010—divestment from Ireland (low-end,
mid-range server)
• 2010—investment (relocation) to China
(low-end, mid-range server)
• 2010—investment to Ireland (research
center)
This case reflects a systematic process led by
constant changes both within the
organization (need to innovate) and in the
organization's external environment. The
series of investments and divestments/




Portugal and Spain • 2006—divestment from Portugal
• 2006—investment (relocation) to Slovenia
• 2006—investment (relocation) to Germany
• 2009—divestment from Spain
• 2013—divestment from Spain
• 2013—investment to Spain
The firm through its investment and
divestment/relocation behavior adjusts to
changes in the external environment.
However, this adjustment is a reactionist
behavior (i.e., the firm has no control over it
and must adapt/react to survive).
In the case of Portugal, the CSAs are no longer
aligned to JC's unchanged FSAs and this
leads to a divestment.
The same argument holds for Spain, but here
there is an additional element—The new
presence of JC's client (Renault). This reflects
a change to the Spanish CSAs and
consequently to an investment back to Spain
in order to support the client.
Procter &
Gamble
Pan-European restructuring • 2004—Divestment from Italy
• 2004—investment (relocation) to France
• 2006—divestment from Spain
• 2006—investment (relocation) to Poland
• 2006—divestment from Ireland
• 2006—investment (relocation) to Poland
• 2006—divestment from Ireland
• 2006—investment (relocation) to Mexico
• 2008—divestment from France
• 2008—investment (relocation) to Spain
• 2009—divestment from Ireland
In the case of P&G we have a firm that
purposefully divest, relocate and reinvest in
the initial location.
The internal environment and the search for
efficiencies plays a major role here.
FSAs are constantly transformed (and the
transformation is enhanced up by the
company-wide restructuring). CSAs of the
host locations play a less important role than
FSAs.
Electrolux Italy, Spain, and United
Kingdom
• 2004—divestment from Italy
• 2004—investment (relocation) to Romania
• 2004—investment (relocation) to China
• 2004—investment (relocation) to Mexico
• 2004—investment (relocation) to Brazil
• 2005—divestment from Spain
• 2005—investment (relocation) to Hungary
• 2008—divestment from the United Kingdom
• 2008—investment (relocation) to Poland
Electrolux closed the profitable Spanish plant
and relocated to Hungary. The United
Kingdom plant was unprofitable and deemed
fitted for closure.
There is clear contrast between the two
divestments (Spain and United Kingdom).
While the Spanish factory was no longer
servicing Electrolux's internationalization
strategy the U.K. factory was generating
losses. The two divestments are driven by
different motives.
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leadership brands. It was founded in 1837 (P&G, 2017) and has grown
brand-wise during its 180 years of operation. Some of its products
require local adaptation due to different consumer preferences. P&G
faces a competing need for global integration and local adaptation of
products. Addressing this need requires the investment of substantial
resources.
The company decided to discontinue 116 brands over a period of
5 years (2012–2017). We argue that this is a reflection of efficiency-
seeking motive driving Pg.'s restructuring activities and investment
patterns. P&G mercilessly divests assets that prevent development
and affect the efficiency balance. P&G does not only divest activities
but also restructures the MNE network, creating tighter links between
subsidiaries and focusing towards increasing the overall efficiency.
Yannis Skoufalos, global product supply officer, stated that he is
“reworking the [supply chain] system as if he is building it from
scratch – a monumental task for a company of P&G's size”
(Reingold, 2016, p. 180). A number of events highlight P&G's behavior
starting from a relocation from Italy to France in 2004. In 2006, P&G
decided to close and relocate from Spain to Poland and in 2008 to
close and relocate from France to Spain. We feel that this chain of
events reflects part of the strategic action to reduce the number of
brands in the portfolio. P&G's example shows that divestments are
not just an occasional behavior, but also a vital activity that allows the
MNE to reinvest the divested capital in more suitable locations. To
emphasize our point even further, we highlight three divestment cases
that were announced to take place in Ireland between 2006–2009. In
2006, P&G announced the closure of their Irish skin-care division and
relocation of activities to Poland. Also, in 2006, P&G decided to dis-
continue the dental floss production in Ireland and relocate it to Mex-
ico. We can argue, therefore, that P&G in 2006–2008 reassembled
their European network of resources to make it more efficient. Finally,
in 2009, P&G closed another plant in Ireland without further
relocation.
3.4 | Electrolux and the move to Poland
Electrolux belongs to the household appliance segment of the con-
sumer electronics industry. Electrolux was founded in 1901
(Marketline, 2016) and since 2004 has been restructuring its entire
network of operations. Out of a total of 36 investments that Elec-
trolux has in the EU, 14 are in Poland. In other words, 39% of all
European investments are located in Poland. In Electrolux's case, there
is an interesting case of divestment from Italy that highlights the scale
of the restructuring process that started in 2004. In 2004, Electrolux
announced the closure of two Italian plants and restructuring mea-
sures for the remaining two factories in Italy. Electrolux decided to
relocate the production to four different countries: Romania, China,
Mexico, and Brazil. This restructuring was also complemented by the
divestment of Spanish plants and the relocation of activities to Hun-
gary. Remarkably, the Spanish plant was closed despite being profit-
able demonstrating that strategic considerations leading to footloose
behavior are going beyond financial profitability. Finally, in 2008,
Electrolux announced that their U.K. subsidiary was generating losses
forcing the company to relocate the production to Poland.
3.5 | Summary of the four cases
The earlier four cases relate to large, mature, and diversified MNEs
that have operations spanning across several countries and with dif-
ferent subsidiaries' mandates. In all cases we have seen that the evo-
lution of the multinational network is a series of new investments,
divestments, relocations and re-investments or changes in subsidiaries
mandates. Table 2 summarizes the four cases and offers grounds for
comparison. We provide the sequential investments, divestment and
relocations in column 3 and a brief explanation summarizing the key
findings in column 4.
In the case of P&G the footloose behavior is represented by a
pan-European restructuring of operations complemented by a signifi-
cant reduction to the brand portfolio to address changes in the exter-
nal European markets. Divestments from peripheral countries such as
Spain and Italy were complemented by investments in either core
countries such as France or central and eastern European countries
like Poland. This led to a reduction of costs servicing the markets
given the nature of P&G's products. In the case of IBM, we have seen
a series of investments and relocations to ensure a better bundling of
FSAs with CSAs as well as upgrading capabilities of subsidiaries. In the
case of Johnson Controls we can see the importance of clients/
partners in the investment behavior of an MNE. The initial divestment
from Spain was reverted in order to be able to service a strategic
partner such as Renault. Finally, the case of Electrolux highlights the
importance of strategic over simple financial considerations in the
decision process of MNEs. Whilst the Spanish operation was profit-
able a decision was made to relocate it in order to better serve Elec-
trolux's strategic mandate.
These case studies suggest that the footprint of the modern MNE
does not stay still and is subject to constant change through new
investments, changes in subsidiaries mandates but also relocations
and closures. Our extension of internalization theory discussed in the
conceptual section provides a useful tool in understanding the behav-
ior of the MNE from a holistic approach.
4 | CONCLUSION
The main aim of this article is to extend internalization theory by
explaining not only investments but also divestment and relocation
activity. The literature does not always make a distinction between
the expansion investment and relocation while evaluating the deter-
minants of the “investment” (Sleuwaegen & Pennings, 2006). This
logic limits our understanding of both processes because the invest-
ment exemplifies the expansion related activity, but relocation exem-
plifies the move of production facilities from one country to another
(Mucchielli & Saucier, 1997). In this article, we explore a new way of
investigating the MNE's expansion activity through the lens of
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systematic “repeated relocations,” which we approach as footloose
behavior. Instrumental in our extension of internalization theory is the
work of Rugman and Verbeke (1992) and the way MNEs bundle,
unbundle and re-bundle CSAs and FSAs to achieve their strategic
goals. This approach enables us to expand internalization theory in
explaining not only how MNE behaves vis-à-vis new investments but
also explicitly address the restructuring (i.e., unbundling and re-bun-
dling) processes that take place within the network of the MNE.
We contribute to the literature by conceptualizing the footloose
behavior, through an extension of internalization theory and providing
a new way of exploring the MNEs' investment behavior. The evolu-
tion of CSAs and FSAs and the ability of the MNE to combine them in
order to create strong FSAs is the first process through which we can
explain footloose behavior. The failure of the MNE to bundle CSAs
and FSAs successfully in a location creates the necessary conditions
for future divestment, especially if CSAs change. We then take this
argument a step further, and argue that investment motives, as
suggested by Rugman (2010), could also contribute to footloose
behavior. Motives that build on a combination of low-level FSAs with
CSAs, such as resource, market and efficiency-seeking, generate the
appropriate conditions for footloose behavior to emerge in contrast
to strategic asset-seeking that builds on a high level FSAs. Finally, two
aspects of the MNE network can moderate footloose behavior. HQ-
subsidiary interdependence and operational flexibility both contribute
to the MNE's ability to transform resources and capabilities and re-
bundle them in a way that contributes to the achievement of a long-
term strategic goal.
From a practical perspective, our study clarifies how to manage
large, mature MNEs and how to keep an optimal balance between the
size of the firm and future growth, that is, how to manage a large
organization and maintain efficiency while responding to changes in
CSAs and FSAs. Casson (2014) argues that even those who are closely
involved do not usually foresee failures of the firms. Thus, it is crucial
for managers to embrace and understand the complexity of the multi-
national enterprise, and to understand that the “balance and the
boundaries of firms are subject, as always, to conflicting pressures”
(Buckley, 2014, p. 231).
The main limitation of our study lies in the empirical validation of
the conceptual framework. Whilst we have offered a number of prac-
tical examples it would be beneficial to examine our conceptual argu-
ments to a wider population of MNEs coming from a variety of
sectors, locations and engaging in a diversity of activities. This would
enable us to draw generalizable conclusions and provide stronger
empirical validation to the internalization theory and our proposed
extension.
From a future research perspective, our study has a number of
extensions. Thus far, IB literature emphasizes the negative side of
footloose behavior. Despite the fact that divestment creates a void in
the host country economy, we are at odds with this conclusion. We
argue that the perception of footloose behavior has a relative nature.
For example, for the country where MNE divests, footloose behavior
may have negative consequences whilst for the country where the
MNE consequently invests, it will bring benefits. This argument can
also be expanded further and explore cases where MNEs are moving
obsolete or mature technologies to other locations, and this provides
the opportunity to the host location to upgrade and enhance its CSAs.
This has been the case of Ireland and IBM. IBM has transferred low
value-added activities to Singapore and China whilst upgrading its
activities in Ireland. This has been clearly a beneficial activity for the
Irish economy. MNEs, therefore, through footloose behavior and the
change in subsidiaries' mandates could create positive effects for host
locations. Further research is necessary to understand the exact con-
ditions where an MNE can bring positive effects to the host location
through footloose behavior.
In conclusion, for the MNE itself, footloose behavior can be a
matter of survival, and this should be acknowledged in future
research. Lessons can be drawn that not all investments will be “new
investments,” as some may be simply “relocation investments” and
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